Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification
Geoffrey P. Miller1

Abstract: This article explores the extent (if any) to which a court should inquire
into the merits of a case when deciding on motions to certify a class. The Article
examines three stylized rules: strong-form rules which preclude inquiry into the merits
and require the court to take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true for
purposes of the class certification motion; weak-form rules which permit the court to
inquire into merits issues that are convenient or useful in connection with the analysis of
Rule 23’s certification requirements; and super-weak rules which permit or require the
court to inquire into the class’s ultimate chances of success on the merits. The Article
evaluates these rules along the following dimensions of public policy: fidelity to law;
accuracy in adjudication; fairness with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments;
fairness with respect to settlements; and judicial efficiency. The Article concludes that
weak-form rules dominate over the others along most policy dimensions.

In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,2 the Supreme Court declared that federal courts
may not “conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”3 This proscription – sometimes known
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as the “Eisen” rule – has become a pillar of class action practice, both under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and under state-court class action procedures.4 The rule can
have a crucial influence on whether a case is certified as a class action – and, given the
importance of certification, on the success or failure of the litigation.5
This Article analyzes the proper scope of a court’s inquiry into the merits when
ruling on motions to certify a class. Part I of the Article distinguishes three approaches to
this question: strong-form rules that prohibit inquiries into the merits and require the
court to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; weak-form rules that
permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification; and super-weak
rules which permit or require the court to investigate the class’s chances of success in the
litigation. Parts II-VI compare these rules with respect to the values of fidelity to law,
accuracy in adjudication, fairness with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments,
fairness in settlements, and judicial economy. Part VII argues that weak- form rules are
superior to the alternative approaches.
I. The Faces of Eisen
The rule that the trial court should not inquire into the merits at the time it decides
the motion to certify a class is simple to state but difficult to apply. The key terms –
“merits” and “inquiry” – have no clear meaning in the law. The facts of Eisen provide
4
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little help. Because the case concerned notice costs and not certification, the rule is pure
dictum.6 Later cases have only compounded the problems.7
This Part investigates possible approaches to the question of the preliminary
merits review on certification. It classifies Eisen rules into three stylized variants. The
purpose is to identify types of rule that can then be compared and contrasted along
various dimensions of public policy.
The following hypothetical case illustrates contexts in which Eisen rules may
apply. Plaintiff’s counsel brings a putative opt-out class action against the manufacturer
of a product alleging violations of a consumer protection statute. Certification is
governed by a class action rule identical to Federal Rule 23. The consumer protection
statute states that the measure of damages is the difference between what the plaintiff
paid for the product and what the product would be worth if the defendant’s
representations were true. The statute is ambiguous on whether individual reliance can
be presumed where the statements complained of are contained in defendant’s uniform
printed materials.
Defendant resists certification on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
the issues common to the class do not predominate over the individual issues because the
measure of damages requires a determination of how much each class member paid for
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the product; (3) the representative plaintiff’s claims are not typical of the class because
the products in question were manufactured at different plants using different
technologies; (4) the common questions do not predominate because individual reliance
is an element of the action for damages; (5) predominance is lacking because many class
members made claims under the express warranty; and (6) certification should be denied
because the class’s claims are frivolous.
What limitations (if any) does Eisen impose on the scope of the court’s inquiry
and analysis? The questions on which issue is joined involve distinctly different judicial
inquiries.
The issue of numerosity is substantially unrelated to the merits. The relevant
inquiries are factors such as the number of members of the class, their places of
residence,8 and the ease of locating them and joining them in an individual action.9 One
matter that may bear on numerosity – for example, the average size of class claims10 –
does potentially implicate the merits (the stronger the claims, the larger the expected
recovery per class member). But by and large the inquiry is not merits-based.
The second issue – whether the determination of individual damages defeats
predominance – requires that the court at least look to the merits. The predominance
analysis requires a weighing of the common and individual issues and a comparison
between them. But such an inquiry, while it does look to the merits, need not involve
even a preliminary assessment of any substantive issue. Because the statute is clear on
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the measure of damages, the court merely needs to analyze whether the common
questions will predominate (e.g., take up more of the court’s and the litigants’ time and
efforts).
The third issue is whether typicality is defeated because the allegedly defective
products were manufactured at different plants. The court cannot properly evaluate this
argument without investigating whether the claims of class members who purchased
products made in one factory are different than the claims of class members who
purchased products made in the other factory. At least some inquiry into the merits
appears to be required to reach an informed judgment about this question.
The fourth issue turns on an interpretation of the consumer protection statute. It is
evident that the court cannot intelligently evaluate whether individual questions of
reliance defeat predominance without knowing whether class members will have to prove
reliance. But this is also a key matter in dispute on the merits. If the court concludes
preliminarily that the statute requires individual reliance, this may defeat certification, but
it will also be a conclusion which, if it holds up at trial, reduces the strength of the
plaintiff’s claims. Conversely, if the court concludes preliminarily that individual
reliance is not an element of the statute, the court may conclude that the common issues
predominate. But if this conclusion holds up at trial, it will also strengthen the class’s
case on the merits because class members will not have to establish individual reliance in
order to obtain relief. As to this issue, therefore, the central focus of the certification
inquiry directly overlaps a crucial merits determination.
The fifth issue, going to waiver of claims, may involve both factual and legal
inquiries. Factually, the plaintiff’s counsel may contest the defendant’s argument that
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numerous class members have made claims under the warranty; legally, counsel may
argue that a claim under the warranty does not foreclose a subsequent lawsuit under the
consumer protection statute. Each of these issues is tied up in the merits. But the scope
of preliminary inquiry differs. As to the legal issues, the court need only consider the
briefs and arguments of the parties (supplemented if necessary by the court’s own
research). As to the factual question, the court could consider documentary evidence or
witness testimony and may allow adversarial testing (for example, depositions or crossexamination).
The final issue is distinctive in that it does not bear on any specific issue of class
certification. In arguing that the class claims are frivolous, the defendant is inviting the
court to use class certification as a preliminary screen to filter out bad cases. The scope
of preliminary inquiry needed to address this issue will necessarily be broader than the
inquiries needed for other issues because here the matter in question is the ultimate issue
for resolution in the lawsuit.
With this example in mind, we can attempt to make sense of possible rules. Some
issues are not in dispute. Courts agree that the Eisen rule applies only to the merits.
Thus, in the example above, Eisen would not preclude investigation into numerosity
because this inquiry has no substantial relationship to the merits.11 It is also clear that the
Eisen rule does not preclude a careful analysis of the pleadings so long as the court makes
no judgments about the substantive claims. Finally, it is clear that the ultimate burden of
proof on certification rests on the party seeking class treatment – nearly always the
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plaintiff.12 Beyond these areas of agreement, however, the case law offers a menu of
interpretations.
A. Strong-Form Rules
The most common formulation holds that a court ruling on a motion to certify the
class may not go beyond the face of the pleadings with respect to any issues relating to
the merits, but must instead accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.13
This strong-form rule involves a number of subsidiary questions as to which courts may
express different opinions:
(a) Can there be inquiry beyond the pleadings if the matter in dispute goes to the
merits of the named plaintiff’s case, but not to the merits of the class case as a whole? This
situation often arises when the defendant challenges the representative plaintiff’s adequacy
or typicality.14 In Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp.,15 the defendant argued that the named
plaintiffs were inadequate because they provided testimony that was demonstrably false.16
The court rejected the argument, citing the principle that “any inquiry concerning . . .
credibility is an impermissible examination of the merits.”17 Here, the court applied a
strong-form rule to bar inquiry into the named plaintiff’s case. In other cases, however,
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courts do not apply a strong-form rule strictly when the merits issues relate only to the
individual plaintiff.18
(b) What should the court do with respect to defenses? In the example above, this
issue would be raised by the defendant’s argument that class members who returned the
express warranty waived their rights to obtain relief under other legal theories, thereby
creating individual defenses that defeat predominance. Some courts refuse certification if
the defendant’s pleadings raise affirmative defenses which, if true, would negate an
element required for certification.19 Other courts apply a strong-form rule in a proplaintiff way even for defenses, holding that to take cognizance of the defenses would
delve impermissibly into the merits.20 Still others deal with this problem through
interpretations of Rule 23: they hold that it is not necessary to look beyond the pleadings
because the affirmative defenses, even if proved, would not defeat certification.21
(c) The scope of a strong-form rule also depends on the detail that courts will
require in pleadings. Merely alleging that Rule 23 is satisfied is not sufficient.22 Neither
are pleadings that refer to the elements of Rule 23 in purely conclusory fashion.23 The
pleadings must set forth “an adequate statement of the basic facts.”24 But they need not
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contain the sort of detail that is required, for example, for allegations of common law
fraud.25
(d) Courts adopting a strong-form rule sometimes justify inquiries beyond the
pleadings on the ground that they do not involve the “merits.” In Lehocky v. Tidel
Technologies, Inc.,26 the court faced the question whether a fraud-on-the-market
presumption obviated the need to prove reliance for each class member – an issue going
to certification. The court took evidence on this question on the ground that the fraud-onthe-market analysis was not an inquiry into the “merits.”27 By manipulating the concept
of the “merits” the court was able to remain formally in compliance with a strong-form
rule while still considering evidence relevant to certification.
(e) Courts that endorse a strong-form rule typically permit the trial judge to go
beyond the pleadings to “understand” the case.28 The court’s job is to “envison” the form
a trial will take.”29 This approach, drawing on the Manual on Complex Litigation,30
attempts to reconcile the notion that Eisen precludes going beyond the pleadings with the
practical necessity of doing so if judicial rulings on matters such as predominance are to
be meaningful.31 Even if the court engages in a “thorough” examination of the relevant
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evidence,32 however, its task is only to predict how the trial will proceed, not to resolve
contested issues of fact or law.
(f) A rule against probing behind the pleadings will not prevent preliminary
inquiries if the pleadings are patently frivolous.33 In Martin v. American Medical
Systems, Inc.,34 the representative plaintiff alleged that all recipients of the defendant’s
penile implant devices had experienced problems with the product. The court looked
behind the pleadings and concluded that many recipients had not experienced problems.
Because such class members were not harmed, the plaintiff was neither typical of the
class nor capable of providing adequate representation. It appears clear that the judge
found the allegation that all devices had malfunctioned to be patently incredible and
rejected it on this ground.
Similarly, courts employing a strong-form rule may look beyond the pleadings
when an issue of law bearing on certification is conclusively established by controlling
precedent. McBride v. Reliastar Mortg. Corp.35 was a putative class action under the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). The plaintiff alleged that the common
issues predominated because the defendant’s practice of paying mortgage brokers for
order flow violated the statutory rights of all class members. Refusing to certify the
class, the court observed that merely paying for order flow was not enough to state a
cause of action under RESPA; individualized proof was required. The court, in other
words, refused to accept the plaintiff’s characterization of the case and instead conducted
its own analysis of governing law.
32
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(g) The application of a strong-form rule may vary depending on whether the
issue is one of fact or law. As to factual inquiries, the rule is typically applied in a
straightforward way. In the example above, defendant alleges that the plaintiff would not
be an adequate or typical representative of class members who purchased goods
manufactured at other plants. The plaintiff alleges that all of the defendant’s products
wherever manufactured were subject to the defect. For purposes of the motion for class
certification, a court employing a strong- form rule would accept as true the allegation that
all products were subject to the defect regardless of place of manufacture.
Application of a strong-form rule to questions of law is more problematic. In
Rosen v. Fidelity Fixed Income Trust,36 the defendant issued three registration statements.
The representative plaintiff alleged that she purchased her shares in reliance on one of the
statements. This raised a certification issue: was the representative plaintiff typical of the
class when some class members had purchased shares as to which a different registration
statement was in effect? The defendant asserted that the representative plaintiff could not
claim injury stemming from misstatements in another registration statement. Plaintiff’s
counsel responded that a party could recover for misstatements in a different registration
statement when the underlying securities were identical. The court avoided this issue by
reference to Eisen. Whether a party who has been misled by one registration statement
has standing to recover for other registration statements was a merits issue foreclosed to
the court in ruling on class certification. Thus, typicality was not defeated: “[t]o the
extent that Plaintiff may pursue her [securities law] claims against each of the three
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registration statements, her claims are typical of class.”37 Other courts do not apply a
strong-form rule to purely legal questions. In Gibbs Products Corp. v. Cigna Corp.,38 a
question at certification was whether the class was entitled to a presumption of reliance in
a RICO mail fraud claim. If the court had applied the facial validity standard to this issue
it would have accepted the plaintiff’s interpretation of RICO. Instead, the court inquired
into the merits and held that a presumption of reliance was not allowed.39
2. Weak-Form Rules
Weak-form rules provide permit inquiries into the merits if they bear an
appropriate relationship to an the issue of certification.40 In the hypothetical case
described above, for example, it might be desirable for the trial court to inquire into the
defendant’s claim that different technologies of production at different plants defeated
certification. But it might not be necessary for the court to inquire into the related issue
of whether the technologies were equally prone to producing the alleged defect.
Weak-form rules are finding increasing acceptance. Two court of appeals
decisions from 2001 are particularly noteworthy. In Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,41
Judge Easterbrook denounced strong-form rules as having “nothing to recommend
[them].”42 The trial court must instead make “whatever factual and legal inquires are
necessary.”43 If such an inquiry involved the merits, so be it. In Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
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Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,44 the plaintiffs produced expert testimony on predominance
purporting to demonstrate that economic loss for each class member could be determined
with a simple formula. Because this testimony claimed to provide a potentially viable
measure of class-wide damages, it had an obvious bearing on the merits. Observing that “a
preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes necessary to determine whether the
alleged claims can be properly resolved as a class action,”45 Judge Scirica evaluated and
rejected the testimony as both unpersuasive and inadequate to establish compliance with
Rule 23(b)(3).
Weak-form rules implicate two subsidiary questions: (a) when is an inquiry into
the merits excessive? and (b) how preliminary must the preliminary inquiry be?
(a) Some courts employing a weak-form rule declare that the court should not
make unnecessary inquiries into the merits.46 If strictly applied, a necessity standard
would allow inquiries into the merits only if a court could not otherwise make a reasoned
decision on a certification question. Yet strict necessity may not always be required.
Some courts indicate that Eisen merely requires that the trial court exercise “caution” in
evaluating the merits.47 The suggestion may be that while courts should not willfully reach
out to decide merits issues, neither should they avoid inquiries that would be convenient
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and useful to the resolution of the certification motion even if the court might be able to
make a reasoned decision without this information.
(b) There will be delicate questions as to how preliminary the preliminary inquiry
must be. Courts tend to provide upper and lower bounds: the hearing on class
certification should not amount to a “mini-trial”48 but the court must at least survey the
factual scene on a “kind of sketchy relief map.”49 These admonitions leave room for
investigation of merits issues so long as the investigation does not become protracted or
complex. In exercising this discretion, the court will need to determine issues such as
how extensive the hearing will be, what evidence will be considered, and what safeguards
on reliability of evidence will be imposed.
Courts employing a weak-form rule may consider not only the intensity of inquiry
but also the directness of connection between the matters inquired into at certification and
the merits at trial. In some cases, the results of the court’s inquiry at certification, while
related to the merits, will only be indirectly related to the trial outcome. For example, the
court may ask whether a securities market was sufficiently efficient to qualify for a fraudon-the-market presumption. The results of this ruling, if they hold up through trial, will
impact the expected outcome.50 But a ruling that the market is efficient for purposes of
the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not establish liability or damages. Compare
this with cases where the evidence on certification has a direct bearing on the merits. In
Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand,51 for example, the defendant argued that representative
48
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plaintiffs were inadequate because they had purchased securities after the defendant’s
truthful disclosures had cured the market. The court declined to address the question
because the certification issue could be resolved with other facts not so deeply
intertwined with the merits.52
3. Super-Weak Rules
Super-weak rules allow or encourage the court at certification to evaluate the
plaintiff’s probability of success per se (we will refer to this value as p).53 The sixth issue
in the hypothetical case discussed above illustrates this question: the defendant argues
that certification should be denied because the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous. RhonePoulenc,54 the leading case, used such an approach.55 Judge Posner refused to certify a
nationwide class of hemophiliacs who claimed that they had contracted AIDS through
tainted transfusions, in part because he viewed p as exceptionally low. Super-weak rules
open all substantive matters for review at certification subject only to the court’s
discretion to limit the preliminary inquiry in the interests of efficiency and expedition.
II. Fidelity to Law
52

Specifically, the court found that the representative plaintiffs had purchased before the alleged cure.
Several commentators have recently recommended adoption of super-weak rules. Bartlett H.
McGuire advocates a “substantial possibility of success” standard for review of the substantive merits at
certification. Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1996). Robert Bone and David S. Evans propose a super-weak
form rule under which the district court would be required to investigate the merits at certification and
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success” standard. Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke
Law Journal 1251 (2002). A super-weak form rule is recommended for tort class actions in Stephen Berry,
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the trial court determines that the substantive case is “without merit,” class certification should be denied.
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A starting place for comparison is the extent to which these variants are
supportable under existing law.
Strong-form rules have been recited and applied by numerous state and federal
courts in the years since Eisen. Yet while support for strong-form rules may be wide, it is
not deep. Judges typically invoke strong-form rules as a shortcut on the path to
certification. They rarely consider whether such rules are correct interpretations of Eisen
or Rule 23. In fact, strong-form rules cannot be justified on principles of fidelity to law.
They find no grounding in the text of Rule 23 and are inconsistent with its purposes. It
would be bizarre to conclude that the framers of Rule 23 would have set forth a careful
set of prerequisites for class certification only to deny trial courts the ability to apply
those prerequisites in a factually-based and reasoned manner.
Nor can strong-form rules be justified as mandated by Eisen itself. Eisen does not
prohibit inquiries into the merits for purposes of determining whether a class is properly
certifiable. The opinion rejected only preliminary inquiries into the merits that were
unrelated to the criteria of Rule 23 – i.e., that had no proper relevance to certification.
Even taking Eisen’s language at face value, it does not mandate a strong-form rule.
Strong-form rules, moreover, cannot be reconciled with later Supreme Court
cases. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon56 admonished trial courts to
conduct a “rigorous inquiry” at certification57 -- an instruction flatly inconsistent with the
hands-off approach to the merits demanded under a strong-form rule. Basic Inc. v.

56

General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
On the relationship between Falcon and Eisen, see, e.g., Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251, 1267-68 (2002); Priya Laroia,
Individualized Affirmative Defenses Bar Class Certification--Per Se, 2003 University of Chicago Legal
Forum 805, 810 (2003) (recognizing that a “a tension exists between Eisen and Falcon); Love v. Turlington,
733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984).
57
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Levinson58 substituted a substantive presumption of reliance for the blinders on judicial
vision that a strong-form rule imposes.59 The fraud-on-the-market presumption in Basic
cannot be intelligently administered without at least a preliminary look at the merits-related
issue of whether the relevant market is efficient.
Although strong-form rules continue to attract support in the lower federal
courts,60 the trend is against them.61 Even courts paying lip service to a strong-form rules
may undermine them by tone and nuance, cautioning that they should not be
“talismanically” invoked to “artificially limit” a trial court’s reasoned determination on
certification.62 Strong-form rules, in short, have little justification under governing law
aside from the fact that they have been uncritically accepted for so long.
Super-weak rules have even less foundation. They find no authorization in the
specific provisions of Rule 23. Perhaps a super-weak rule could be justified as based on
an additional, non-statutory prerequisite for certification.63 But unlike other non-statutory
certification requirements,64 a prerequisite that the class meet some threshold probability of
success on the merits cannot plausibly be justified as necessary for the effective
administration of the requirements that are explicitly found in the rule. Super-weak rules
58

485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
See, e.g., In re Seagate Technology II Securities Litigation, 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(concluding that Basic cannot be reconciled with Eisen).
60
See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
61
See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001); Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell
for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 374
(1996).
62
Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213 F.R.D.
484 (S.D.Fla. 2003).
63
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Columbia Law
Review 1343, 1439 (1995).
64
Non-statutory requirements have been recognized in addition to the explicit requirements for
certification under Rules 23(a) and (b) – for example, the requirements that there be a reasonably definite
class, see, e.g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1997), or in a
59
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are also inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of Eisen itself.65 The very defect
complained of in Eisen was the fact that the district court had investigated p.66 Only one
lower federal court – the Seventh Circuit – has endorsed a super-weak rule,67 and even this
decision has been questioned by later authority in the circuit.68
In contrast to strong-form and super-weak rules, weak-form rules are easy to
justify under existing law. The court applying a weak-form rule is simply engaged in the
normal and expected judicial task of marshalling relevant evidence and applying the law to
the facts. In fact, any reasonable interpretation of Rule 23 mandates a weak-form rule,
since the framers of the rule must have intended to equip trial courts with the resources to
make an informed and reasoned decision.
Weak-form rules are consistent with Eisen. As noted, that opinion merely
repudiated the practice of inquiring into p. It did not prohibit inquiries at certification that
overlapped merits issues when the purpose of the preliminary inquiry was to evaluate
compliance with Rule 23. Indeed, the Court indicated that preliminary inquiries into the
merits are often necessary to determine “whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.”69
Weak-form rules are consistent with the “rigorous scrutiny” demanded by the Supreme
Court’s later decision in Falcon.70 They authorize trial courts to inquire into the merits

(b)(2) case, that the class is sufficiently cohesive as to make classwide adjudication appropriate. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1999).
65
See In re Copley Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 461 (D. Wyo. 1995) (interpreting RhonePoulenc as inconsistent with Eisen).
66
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 179, quoting Miller v. Mackey International, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971). But see
George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 Journal of Legal
Studies 521, 571 (1997) (suggesting that Eisen “does not directly preclude this second, negative review: the
determination that if the underlying substantive claim is without merit, class certification should be denied.”)
67
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
68
See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[t]he
success of the 1966 amendments (which are still in force) depends on . . . judicial willingness to certify classes
that have weak claims as well as strong ones.”).
69
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 179, quoting Miller v. Mackey International, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).
70
General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982)
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whenever doing so is convenient or useful to resolve a certification question. Weak-form
rules are also indicated by the Court’s decision in Basic.71 A trial court cannot realistically
inquire into the efficiency of the market without preliminarily examining a question which
is deeply interwoven with the merits. Consistent with these cases, the recent trend in the
lower federal courts has been to endorse weak-form rules.72
III. Accuracy in Adjudication
The Eisen Court objected to preliminary inquiries on the ground that that the lack
of trial-type procedures would result in inaccurate decisions.73 Two possible errors are
relevant: (a) error in certification; and (b) error at trial.74
A. Error in Certification
Strong-form rules create significant dangers of certification error.75 There is no
doubt that merits issues can be relevant to certification.76 Obviously a court is more
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Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
See cases cited at note xx, supra.
73
See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78; In re: Buspirone Patent Litigation; In re: Buspirone Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15867 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (reaching the merits might “subject some parties to
adverse merits rulings without the benefit of the rules and procedural safeguards that traditionally apply in
civil trials”); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Policy Holders & Members, 323 Ark. 706, 918
S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1996).
74
For general discussion about the value of adequacy in litigation, See Louis Kaplow, The Value of
Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307 (1994).
75
Consistently with the analysis in this paper, Bone and Evans conclude that courts are more likely to
commit error in certification decisions under Eisen than under a rule that permits a court to make a
preliminary inquiry into the merits at the certification stage. See Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251, 1313-14 (2002). Their model depends
on the proposition that in an Eisen regime, class action attorneys will be more likely to file frivolous lawsuits,
which are not effectively screened due to the Eisen rule and which therefore generate a rate of erroneous
certification grants under Eisen that is higher than the rate of erroneous certification denials under a regime
allowing preliminary inquiry. The Bone-Evans model depends on the premise that strong-form jurisdictions
will attract a significant number of frivolous lawsuits. As yet there is no empirical verification of this
proposition. The Bone-Evans model also ignores the costs in review-of-the-merits jurisdictions associated
with the possibility that non-frivolous class actions will not be brought because of the possibility of erroneous
refusals to certify. More fundamentally, the Bone-Evans model does not account for another reason why
errors in certification are more likely under a strong-form rule than under a rule permitting preliminary
inquiry. Because the merits are often relevant to certification, a court that is permitted to inquire into them at
the certification is more likely to reach a correct result than a court that is barred from such an inquiry.
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likely to make a correct decision on certification if it is allowed to look into the relevant
facts and circumstances than if it is limited to accepting the truth of the facts presented in
pleadings of a biased litigant.77
The impact of super-weak rules depends in part on whether p is a criterion or
factor for certification under Rule 23. If p is not a certification factor, judicial inquiry
into p may increase error at certification because the court will consider a potentially
confounding question. On the other hand, inquiry into p may to some extent also
improve accuracy in the certification decision to the extent that p correlates with a
specific Rule 23 factor.
If p is a certification factor, then a preliminary inquiry into p will improve accuracy
of decisions, provided the court correctly assesses p. There are reasons to believe courts
will often assess p correctly. The trial judge will usually be experienced at assessing
litigation outcomes.78 The judge, moreover, has discretion over how the preliminary
inquiry should be conducted. Where the facts or law are clear, the judge may be able to
reach a reliable result in fairly short order. Where the issues are murkier, the judge may

76

See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982) (class determination
generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s
cause of action); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (same).
77
See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[t]he court is bound to take the
substantive allegations of the complaint as true, thus necessarily making the class order speculative in the
sense that the plaintiff may be altogether unable to prove his allegations.”) Although the court may revise a
certification order found to be erroneous, see FRCP 23(c)(1)(C) (“[a]n order [certifying a class] may be
altered or amended before final judgment”), this is no reason to allow error at the outset. Later correction of
erroneous certification grants will not avoid the interim costs incurred by the parties (including notice costs)
during the period in which the class was certified. As a practical matter, moreover, cases are rarely
decertified. Reliance on later review of certification orders as an answer to the error problem can encourage
sloppy analysis at the front end. See Southwestern Refining Col, Inc. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000)
(rejecting a to reject a “certify now, revise later” approach to certification); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe,
2002 WL 31426407 (Tex. 2002) (holding that certification may only be based on “actual, not presumed”
conformance with the class action rule).
78
Motions for preliminary injunctions are an example. The court in such cases is not only permitted,
but in fact required to look into the merits in such cases in order to weigh the parties’ respective
probabilities of success.
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require a more intensive process before “coming to rest.”79 Judges will not always assess
p correctly, however. P is not a narrow issue that can be addressed in a focused pre-trial
inquiry. In consequence, the lack of trial-type procedures at certification might impair
accuracy in the court’s assessment.80 Even if p is a factor at certification, therefore, there
appears to be a non-trivial risk that a trial court will incorrectly assess p and accordingly
decide the certification erroneously.
Weak-form rules are clearly superior to strong-form rules as far as certification
error is concerned. It could hardly be otherwise because weak-form rules permit inquiry
into relevant issues foreclosed to the court under strong-form rules. The comparison with
super-weak rules is more complicated. If p is a factor at certification, the weak-form rule
could be inferior to the super-weak rule as regards the probability of error at certification
because the weak-form rule would then prohibit the trial court from considering relevant
information. On the other hand, because the inquiry under a weak-form rule is more
focused than under a super-weak rule, the increased certification error resulting from the
failure to consider p would have to be weighed against the greater probability of correctly
analyzing the factors that are considered. If p is not a factor at certification, the weak-form
rule is strictly superior to the super-weak rule. The weak-form rule focuses the court’s
attention on the factors relevant to certification and does not direct the court’s attention to a
potentially confounding inquiry.
B. Error at Trial
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The phrase is from General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
Important documents or witnesses may be unavailable, for example. Even if such evidence is
available, the court may exclude it in the interests of expediting the certification inquiry. Witness
testimony may not be properly evaluated for credibility. The relevant assessment rule may also play a role:
if the court is required to place a thumb on the scale when reviewing the plaintiff’s evidence, the result will
be to increase the probability of erroneous certifications.
80
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Turning to error at trial, consider first the application of a strong-form rule.
Because the court gives no consideration to the merits under a strong-form rule, the
certification decision should have no effect on the accuracy of trial outcomes. Whether
or not it is certified, the litigation progresses like any other casewith the facts and law
determined in the ordinary course.
Super-weak rules have an ambiguous effect on trial accuracy. As we have seen,
the court’s preliminary inquiry into p may or may not be accurate. An accurate
assessment of p may improve the accuracy of trial. Because the court has an early
exposure to the case, the judge will be familiar with the facts and law and will likely
make better rulings. The judge’s preliminary rulings may also facilitate more accurate
settlements. An inaccurate assessment of p creates a significant risk of error at trial,
however.81 Many judges will avoid placing inappropriate weight on the results of the
preliminary investigation and will be open to changing their views as trial progresses.
But some judges may feel that changing their previously-announced views would reflect
negatively on their abilities. Other judges might experience a cognitive bias created when
an initial view of the case, although erroneous, becomes fixed in their minds.82 If the
judge for whatever reason is unduly attached to her erroneous estimate of p, the effect
may be to alter the trial outcome unless the merits are clear. This is the scenario that
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See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 401 (1996) (recognizing that “preliminary assessments could be
very troublesome--and misleading--if they were based on inadequate information and therefore unreliable” but
arguing that the concern is not as great as commonly supposed because of safeguards that can be incorporated
into the preliminary hearing).
82
Similarly, where the parties reach a settlement of the case, the judge will have to evaluate the
proposal for fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness. If the judge has been erroneously preconditioned to
maintain a certain attitude towards the litigation, this may influence how the judge assesses the settlement,
resulting in the possibility of error harmful to absent class members.
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troubled the Court in Eisen when it warned that tentative findings might “color”
subsequent proceedings.83
The weak-form rule is likely to be less effective at achieving accuracy at trial than
the strong-form rule, although the effect is ambiguous. When the court examines a merits
issue relevant to certification, this may introduce the possibility of bias at trial with
respect to that issue. However, because the inquiry under a weak- form rule is focused on
particular issues, the court is likely to make a correct determination at certification, and
thus the chance of subsequent bias that distorts outcomes at trial will be low. Moreover,
bias with respect to a particular issue may not translate into distortions in outcome
because many other issues as to which the court does not have a bias will contribute to
the result. At the same time, the weak-form rule directs the court’s attention to merits
issues at an early stage of the litigation and thus may assist the court in making better
decisions later on.
Weak-form rules may or may not be superior to super-weak rules as regards
accuracy at trial. If the court accurately assesses p, a super-weak rule will be superior to
a weak-form rule because the latter excludes consideration of p and an accurate
assessment of p should improve trial accuracy. If the court erroneously assesses p, the
weak-form rule will usually be superior to the super-weak rule because of the danger that
the court in a super-weak regime will not correct the error at trial.84
IV. Fairness with Respect to the Preclusive Effect of Judgments
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Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
The court might also make an error in its assessment of the merits under a weak-form rule.
However, we have seen that because of the inquiry is more focused in weak-form rules, the possibility of error
is considerably lower than the possibility that a court applying a super-weak rule will make an error as to p.
For the same reason, if the court does make an error on the merits under a weak-form rule, this is less
likely to skew the outcome as compared with a strong-form rule, where the issues presented on certification
are the ultimate issues in the case.
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The Eisen Court was also concerned that preliminary inquiries into the merits
would inflict “substantial prejudice” on defendants85 by skew the playing field in
plaintiffs’ favor with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments. Prior to 1966,
potential plaintiff in “spurious” class action could wait in the wings and await
developments in the case before deciding whether to participate.86 They could intervene
when the outcome was or was likely to be favorable and remain outside the case when the
outcome was or was likely to be unfavorable.87 Rule 23(c)(1) was designed in part to
discourage such “one-way intervention” by bringing parties into the case at the earliest
practicable time.88 Mutuality of estoppel would thus be enhanced.89 But preliminary
inquiry might reintroduce one-way intervention in a new guise because it would allow
absent plaintiffs to be bound by favorable judgments and to avoid unfavorable ones. This
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Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“If the evidence at the trial
made their prospective position as actual class members appear weak, or if a judgment precluded the
possibility of a favorable determination, such putative members of the class who chose not to intervene or join
as parties would not be bound by the judgment.”).
87
See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (a “ recurrent source of abuse
under the former Rule lay in the potential that members of the claimed class could in some situations await
developments in the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation
would be favorable to their interests”); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1974)
(“[m]any commentators objected that one-way intervention had the effect of giving collateral estoppel effect
to the judgment of liability in a case where the estoppel was not mutual. This was thought to be unfair to the
defendant”).
Opposition to one-way intervention was not universal. One of the most influential articles on class
action practice under old Rule 23 supported one-way intervention, notwithstanding the perception that it was
“not cricket” to allow class members to “place their bets after the race was over.” Harry Kalven Jr. and
Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 University of Chicago Law Review 684,
715 (1940-41) (Kalven and Rosenfield are not responsible for the mixed sports metaphor, which is due to
combining quotes from different sentences). Their support of one-way intervention was due, in part, to their
belief that the Constitution would not permit otherwise unrelated parties who had not joined the action to be
bound by the preclusive effect of a judgment.
88
See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966 amendments were
designed, in part, specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that members of
the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and
judgments”); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (1966 amendment intended to
prevent “sideline sitting” by class members); Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 483
F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1973); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (D. Ohio 1969) (revisions were
intended to prevent one-way intervention).
89
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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is the concern that led the Eisen Court to declare that preliminary inquiries into the merits
were “directly contrary” to Rule 23(c)(1).90
This section compares different Eisen rules with respect to the preclusive effect of
judgments. Two situations are relevant: cherry-picking cases where a plaintiffs obtain a
litigation advantage over the defendant through informed use of opt-out rights and
cherry-dropping cases where the non-mutuality of estoppel is a function of certification
itself and does not depend on the volitional actof any class members.
A. Cherry-Picking: Unfairness Due to Informed Exercise of Opt-Out Rights
The following model illustrates the problem of cherry-picking. Call an absent
class member P and the defendant D. Cases have merit when p is at least 5% and lack
merit when p is less than 5%. When cases have merit, p is either low or high. At
certification, the court applies a strong-form, weak-form, or super-weak rule. Under the
strong-form rule the court certifies the class without inquiring into p. Under the superweak rule the court investigates p and certifies it finds the case to have merit and refuses
to certify if it finds the case to lack merit. In either event the court issues an opinion that
discloses its assessment of p. The class wins at trial when the court preliminarily assesses
p as high and loses at trial when the court preliminarily assesses p as low. Under the
weak-form rule, the court investigates the merits only insofar as they relate to a specific
certification requirement under Rule 23.
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See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. Although the Court indicated that preliminary inquiries were “directly
contrary” to Rule 23(c)(1), it could not have meant that such inquires violated an express prohibition of the
rule. The word “practicable” gives trial courts a significant degree of discretion to manage the timing of
decisions, including the power in appropriate cases to consider merits issues prior to certification. Curtin v.
United Airlines, Inc., 348 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 275 F.3d 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001), citing Cowen v. Bank
United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995). This discretion has been enhanced under newly-amended
Rule 23(c)(1), which requires only that the certification decision be made at an “early practicable time.”
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Suppose a strong-form rule is in effect. Because the court is prohibited from
inquiring into the merits at certification, P has no information about the court’s views.
Because P don’t get an advance peek at the probable outcome, she enjoys no strategic
advantage. Mutuality of estoppel is maintained.
Suppose now that a super-weak rule is in effect. The trial court certifies a (b)(3)
class after assessing p and concluding that the case has merit. The court issues an
opinion explaining its decision and disclosing the court’s estimate of p. If the court
concludes that p is high P remains in the litigation and takes advantage of the anticipated
good outcome. If the court concludes that p is low P opts out and avoids the preclusive
effect of the anticipated bad outcome.91 Because the opt-out decision is made on the
basis of valuable information, P arguably enjoys an unfair strategic advantage.92
However, the likelihood of prejudice to D from the operation of a super-weak rule
is smaller than first appears. Consider the case where P opts out of a class when the court
finds that p is low. This scenario will result in harm to D only if the following conditions
or events occur. P must be someone who would not otherwise opt out. The court must
conclude that the case has merit but p is low. The court must also conclude that the
action is otherwise certifiable. The outcome of the litigation must be unfavorable for P.93
The court’s opinion about p must be communicated to P who must correctly analyze the
opinion, decide to opt out, and actually exclude herself. P must then participate in a
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See Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 (4th Cir. 1980) (the specific concern
of the Eisen court was “to protect the party opposing the class against a no-risk specific testing of the merits of
the claims by a class representative.”)
92
Eisen, supra, 147 U.S. at 177 (preliminary inquiries would permit the representative plaintiff to
“obtain a determination on the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance
that a class action may be maintained.”)
93
If there were no correlation between the results of the preliminary inquiry and the ultimate
judgment or settlement, then the class member would gain no information from the court’s pre-certification
investigation.
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separate lawsuit against D that results in an outcome more favorable to P than the
outcome would have been if she had not opted out.
Some of these conditions appear plausible. For example, because only a small
percentage of class members opt out of the typical case,94 it is likely P would be someone
who would not otherwise opt out. Similarly, it is plausible to assume that the court’s
preliminary assessment of p will align with the final outcome. Other conditions are less
plausible. It would be unusual for the trial court to make preliminary findings that p is
low and also certify the class.95 When p is low, this will usually be for reasons that also
counsel against certification under Rule 23's specific requirements; and when p is high,
this will usually support certification.96 The dynamics of litigation also promote this
alignment: class attorneys are unlikely to support certification with information that
reduces D’s liability and defense attorneys are equally unlikely to resist certification with
information favorable to P. To the extent courts use certification as a preliminary merits
screen, moreover, the effect will further increase the alignment between assessments of
the merits and certification.
It is also doubtful that after opting out P would be able to participate in a different
lawsuit and obtain an outcome more favorable than what P would obtain in the first
action. Such a lawsuit would typically be uneconomic unless P joined another class
94

See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, ___ Vanderbilt Law Review ___ (forthcoming).
95
But not impossible. Imagine, for example, that under the plaintiff’s theory of the case, damages
would have to be individually determined for each class member, whereas under the defendant’s theory of
the case, no class member would be entitled to any damages at all. The court might conclude that the
defendant has the better of the argument about the merits, but might then use this conclusion to support
certification because it eliminates the individual issue of proving damages.
96
For example, in a securities fraud case, it is in the class’s interest at trial for the court to conclude
that a fraud-on-the-market presumption is available, since this will potentially eliminate the otherwise—
applicable requirements of proving individual reliance, damages, and loss-causation. But availability of a
fraud-on-the-market presumption is also crucial to certification. Conversely, if a court refuses to recognize

27

action. But the smaller size97 and lower probability of success98 that would characterize
such alternative litigation would pose an obstacle to any attorney representing such a
class.99 To be successful, moreover, the second lawsuit must be certified if it is a class
action100 and must generate a better outcome for P than the first case would have
generated.101
Also implausible is the premise that P would grasp the full implications of the
preliminary inquiry and take appropriate action in response. There is no requirement that
the judge issue an opinion signaling her views of p. If issued, the opinion would not be
provided to P. P would receive instead a notice of certification coupled with information
about how she can opt out. Even if the notice describes the trial court’s preliminary
assessment of p,102 it is unlikely to convey the clear message that P is better off opting

a fraud-on-the-market presumption, this will be unfavorable to the class on the merits and also reduce the
chance the case will be certified.
97
If the alternative class is composed of people who opted out of the first case, the class size is likely
to be significantly reduced.
98
Any attorney contemplating whether to represent the opt-out class would need to consider
carefully the fact that the trial court in the original action has expressed a negative view of the merits. Even
if the second action is filed in a different jurisdiction, the unfavorable judicial opinion is likely to reduce the
settlement value of the new case.
99
The counsel in the first-filed class action would be in an uncomfortable position representing a
class of persons who opted out of the counsel’s other case. He cannot be expected to come forward as
champion of the opt-out class.
100
The case was certified in the first jurisdiction, but only after the trial court reached an unfavorable
view of the class’s chance on the merits. Class counsel in the second case hopes to persuade the court that
the case can be certified even under a preliminary view of the merits more favorable to the class. But
counsel may not succeed at persuading the second tribunal to accept a view of the merits more favorable to
the class. Moreover, because the decision to certify (or not certify) a class is within the discretion of the
trial court, the outcome of a certification dispute can never be confidently predicted in advance.
101
The probability of a favorable outcome is reduced by the fact that the trial court in the first action
reached an unfavorable view of the class’s chances on the merits. Although such a review would probably
not constrain the power of a different trial judge or jury to reach a contrary conclusion, it nevertheless
stands as a warning signal that an attorney for the class would ignore at her peril.
102
Nothing in Rule 23(c)(2)(B), governing notice in (b)(3) cases, requires that any information about the
court’s certification decision be provided to the class.
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out.103 Few Ps would be able to make an independent evaluation of the pros and cons of
opting out and take appropriate action in response.
Consider now the case where P otherwise would have opted out but decides not to
opt out because the preliminary inquiry discloses the court’s view that p is high. D now
faces a class case with another member. D will suffer prejudice only if a number of
conditions and events occur, however. P must be someone who would otherwise opt out
of the class. The court must make a preliminary finding that p is high and must also
conclude the action otherwise satisfies Rules 23(a) and (b). The preliminary assessment
of p must be communicated to and understood P and must result in her deciding not to
opt out. The ultimate outcome must favor P. And P must impose greater costs on D by
remaining in the case than she would impose by opting out.
The assumptions of this scenario are in some respects more plausible than the
assumptions of the preceding one. It is likely, for example, that if the court certifies the
case it will also make preliminary merits findings that p is high. Similarly, because P
would otherwise opt out, it can be inferred that she is interested enough in the case to
read the class action notice and make a reasoned decision about what to do. It is also
plausible to assume that D will be worse off if P stays in the case than if she opts out.104
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None of the parties responsible for notice has an incentive to convey such information. Once the
class has been certified with a preliminary assessment unfavorable to the class on the merits, the defendant
has an interest in keeping as many class members in the forum as possible in hopes of obtaining a favorable
judgment or settlement binding on all who do not opt out. The plaintiff’s attorney also has an interest in
discouraging opt outs. He or she represents the class in the certified case, and accordingly stands to lose
fees if large numbers of class members defect. As for the trial judge who oversees the certification notice,
there is also little to be gained other than headache if large numbers of class members opt out. The case
will still remain on the judge’s docket, and opt-outs can cause problems if competing class actions are
commenced in other jurisdictions.
104
This is so because many plaintiffs who would have opted out would fail to pursue their claims in
any other forum. The effect is not unambiguous, however. Some plaintiffs would have participated in
litigation against the defendant in an alternative forum if they opted out of the first case. For alternative
litigation to occur, it would be necessary for the opt-out class member to be represented by counsel. While
counsel in the original litigation is unlikely to be available to represent plaintiffs in such a case, there is some
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Other assumptions are less plausible, however. Most importantly, the scenario assumes
that P would otherwise opt out. But class members rarely opt out. Moreover, P might
not change her mind even if she understood the trial court’s preliminary inquiry. Some
people opt out because they don’t like litigation, don’t want to sue D, or just don’t want
to be bothered.
Weak-form rules present an intermediate case. Because they disclose the trial
court’s preliminary assessment of issues relevant to certification, they do offer some
information that P could use to advantage when deciding whether to opt out. The risk of
cherry-picking is therefore higher than in the case of strong-form rules where such
information is prohibited. However, the risk of cherry-picking is significantly lower than
the case of super-weak rules. Because the preliminary inquiry under a weak-form rule
relates only to a specific issue in the case, the trial court's opinion on certification will not
provide an estimate of p. The opinion would require sophisticated analysis before its
impact on p could be understood, a task beyond the means of most class members. The
trial court’s preliminary view of the merits, moreover, is much less likely to align with
the ultimate outcome than is its opinion as to p under a super-weak rule. The merits
issues addressed under a weak-form rule will only be a subset of matters relevant to the
ultimate outcome at trial, and often a small subset at that. The results of the preliminary
assessment under a weak-form rule are also less likely to influence the trial court’s
subsequent conduct in the case. Because the issues addressed under a weak-form rule are

probability that another attorney would come forward to represent the plaintiff in an alternative forum. In the
scenario we are considering, the judge in the first litigation issues a preliminary assessment of the merits
favorable to the class. Given this premise, it is likely that that the merits are reasonably favorable for the class
in alternative forums as well. With a relatively stronger case, counsel is more likely to come forward to
represent class members who do opt out. As to such plaintiffs, the defendant will be worse off from the
party’s decision to remain in the initial litigation only if the added costs or litigation and expected judgment in
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narrow, they are unlikely to exercise as much sway on the trial judge’s mind; and the
presence of many other issues provides cover for the trial court to change her opinion
without admitting error in the initial decision.
2. Cherry-Dropping: Automatic Benefit
The preceding scenarios assume that P actively decides whether to opt out or stay
in a case. But active decision-making is not necessary for P to obtain a benefit analogous
to one-way intervention. This effect can be illustrated if we add to the model set forth
above the assumption that P remains entirely passive in the litigation.
Under a strong-form rule, certification has no relationship to the merits.
Accordingly, there should be no correlation between the two. The certification decision
itself therefore confers no systematic advantage on either party with respect to the
preclusive effect of judgments.
Consider now the situation under a super-weak rule. If the court concludes on
preliminary inquiry that the case is not meritorious, it will not certify the class and P will
automatically avoid the preclusive effect of the adverse judgment. If the court concludes
that the case is meritorious, it will certify the class and declare p as low or high. If the
probabilities of these events were equal, P would not enjoy any systematic advantage
over D in a certified case. But the probabilities are not equal. If the court certifies the
case, it is more likely to conclude that p is high than that p is low. Since the class wins at
trial when the court concludes that p is high, P will obtain the advantage of the favorable
outcome by remaining passive. The result is an approximation of one-way intervention.
The cherries of favorable treatment drop from the tree without having to be picked; the

the initial litigation with that party remaining in the case exceed the added costs of litigation and expected
judgment that would be incurred in the alternative proceeding if the party opted out.
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certification decision itself does the work. Because this effect does not depend on opt-out
rights, moreover, it could exist for mandatory as well as opt-out classes.
Again, however, the harm to D under the super-weak rule turns out to be less
serious than first appears. Consider first the situation where the court certifies the case
and the class wins at trial. P obtains the preclusive effect of a favorable judgment -arguably an unfair result for D. However, for D to be prejudiced by certification, a
number of events or conditions have to be true. Some of these are plausible. It is
reasonable to assume that P will not opt out and that the court will conclude that p is high
in a certified case. It is also reasonable to suppose that the class will win at trial when the
court concludes that p is high. Other events or conditions are less plausible, however.
For D to be prejudiced as a result of the preliminary inquiry, it is usually necessary that
the case would not otherwise be certified. But because strong-form rules require the
court to accept as true the class action allegations in the complaint, the case will
ordinarily be certified under a strong-form rule. Thus, when p is high, the preliminary
inquiry will usually only confirm a result that the court would reach in any event. Hence
D will usually suffer no harm.105
Consider now the case where the trial court denies certification after a preliminary
review of p in a case where P would lose if the case had proceeded to a judgment as a
class action. The effect of the preliminary inquiry would be to deny D the benefit of a
judgment that binds P to the unfavorable outcome. D appears to be prejudiced.
Some parts of the scenario are plausible. Where the class loses at trial, it is likely
that p is low. Where p is low, the trial court is likely to find it to be low at the
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preliminary inquiry. And if the trial court finds p to be so low that the case lacks merit,
the court will refuse to certify the class. It also appears plausible that in the absence of a
preliminary inquiry the court would certify the class, since it would then have to take as
true the class action allegations in the complaint.
However, for this scenario to come to pass, it will be necessary for the court to
conclude at the preliminary inquiry that the case lacks merit. Putting aside settlement
incentives (for the moment), it would be in neither party’s interest to bring this fact to the
court’s attention at certification. P's attorney has two reasons to suppress the information.
If the court knows that the case lacks merit, it is likely to refuse certification and thus
deny P’s attorney the class action she seeks. Even if the court certifies the class, its
advance knowledge that the case lacks merit might prejudice its subsequent conduct of
the trial, leading to a greater probability of a bad outcome for P. D does have an
incentive to inform the court that the case lacks merit -- eventually. But we are here
assuming that D wants the case to be certified so that it can thereafter hold class members
to an unfavorable judgment. D would delay informing the court until after certification,
since informing the court beforehand merely reduces the probability of a result
(certification) that D desires. Unless the court conducts an independent investigation, the
weakness of the class claims is unlikely to come to its attention at certification. It is
therefore unlikely that certification will be denied as a result of the preliminary inquiry.
Suppose, however, that the court does become aware that the case lacks merit,
either because the court is pro-active in seeking information or because D dislikes the
increased risk incident to certification more than it likes the possibility of binding class
105

See Fisher v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 217 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“Eschewing a
preliminary inquiry into the merits and accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, however, accords the
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members to an unfavorable judgment. The court might then refuse to certify the class
even though in the absence of a preliminary investigation it would grant certification.
But even here D would not necessarily suffer material harm from the loss of a preclusive
decree. Preclusion is valuable to D only if P would participate in other litigation in the
event certification is denied. Such follow-on litigation would face serious obstacles.106
The preclusive effect of a decree in a certified class would provide no benefit to D if no
follow-on litigation would be brought.
Weak-form rules are again an intermediate case. The inquiry authorized in a
weak-form rule will, to some extent, align trial outcomes with the results of the court’s
preliminary investigation. Thus, unlike the case with strong-form rules, some cherrydropping effect is possible. But the prejudice to D will be less under a weak-form rule
than under a super-weak rule. The reason is that the alignment between trial outcomes
and preliminary investigation is not as strong. As we have seen, under a weak-form rule
the trial court examines only merits issues insofar as they are convenient or useful to the
analysis of specific Rule 23 prerequisites. Even if they stand up through trial, the court’s
evaluation of those questions will not necessarily determine outcomes because other
issues not relevant to the merits may swamp them out. The trial court, moreover, is less
likely to adopt a biased view of the case at the preliminary inquiry under a weak-form
rule, and thus should be more willing than under a super-weak rule to adjust her views as
the trial progresses. Because certification is not as strongly predictive of trial victory for

same benefits to the plaintiff with even less deference to the defendant's position.”)
106
Although because certification of the first case has been denied, class counsel will be available to
bring the second suit, the first court’s opinion finding that the class claims are weak on the merits would be
a significant deterrent. The attorney may also need to consider the possible effects of the first decision
denying class certification. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir.
2003) (ordering injunction against state court certification of class claims where federal court had previously
denied certification of identical claims).
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the class, cherry-dropping is less of a problem for weak-form rules than it is for superweak rules.
V. Settlement Effects
We now compare Eisen rules with respect to their effects on settlement. Class
certification can convert a small case into one with potentially devastating consequences,107
thus imposing significant settlement pressures on D.108 Refusal to certify a class can have
equally devastating consequences for P since it converts viable class litigation into a
negative value individual case. Which rule is most likely to shield the parties from unfair
settlement pressures?
Consider the following extension on the model previously developed. Call P’s
damages d. P’s expected outcome at trial is p x d. A settlement is fair if it is no more
than twice or less then half p x d and unfair otherwise. All Ps are identically situated and
the requirements for certification are otherwise satisfied. P sues D and moves to certify a
class of 1,000 persons. D is able to satisfy a judgment up to $75,000,000 without
financial distress. Any judgment over $75,000,000 will cause financial distress. D is
averse to the risk of financial distress and will pay up to ten times the expected judgment
at trial to avoid it. D is risk-neutral about judgments that do not cause financial distress.
If P wins on her individual claims, she gets $100,000; if she loses, she gets nothing. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that D will offer its full reservation
price in settlement without adjustment for litigation costs and that P will accept the offer.
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See, e.g., Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke
Law Journal 1251 (2002); cases cited in note x, supra.
108
How overwhelming these pressures are is a matter of current debate. For a debunking view, see
Charles Silver, We’re Scared to Death: Class Certification and Blackmail, 28 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 1357 (2003).
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Both P and D correctly assess p at 1% and d at $100,000 and the court also correctly
assesses p at 1% if a preliminary inquiry is undertaken.
In such circumstances, if a strong-form rule is in effect, the court will not conduct
a preliminary inquiry into p and will certify the class because all other prerequisites of
Rule 23 are satisfied. Once the class is certified, D’s maximum exposure is $100,000,000
and its expected liability at trial is $1,000,000. Because D is averse to the risk of
financial distress posed by the potential exposure to a $100,000,000 judgment, D will pay
$10,000,000 or $10,000 per class member to settle the case. Because this is more than
twice p x d, the settlement is unfair. This is the “blackmail” settlement that proponents of
super-weak rules dislike – a payment far in excess of the actual liability exposure made in
a weak case only because the defendant fears the low-probability outcome.109
The super-weak rule addresses this danger. With such a rule in effect, the court
would conduct a preliminary inquiry into p at certification and refuse to certify the class
upon finding that the case lacks merit. D’s maximum exposure on P’s individual claim is
$100,000. Because D is risk-neutral as to this outcome, it will pay only its expected
judgment p x d to settle P’s case, or $1,000. Even if allPs brought individual lawsuits, D
would still be risk-neutral because no one suit would expose it to a risk of financial
distress; thus D would pay a total of only $1,000,000 to settle all the cases. So long as no
class action is filed in another jurisdiction after the court denies certification, the superweak rule eliminates the unfair settlement as far as D is concerned.
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See, e.g. Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should
Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 373 (1996) (preliminary assessment of the merits would
“preclude certification of the weakest class action claims, where the pressures to settle are particularly
unfair”).
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But while the super-weak rule handles one problem of unfairness, it does so by
creating another. The class claims have some probability of success, albeit a low one (if
the claims were completely frivolous, even a risk-averse defendant would not pay to
settle them because there would be no reason to fear a bad outcome at trial.) A settlement
of P’s claim would be fair if it is at least $500 (half of p x d). But with the super-weak
rule in effect P will obtain much less. D would pay an amount equal to its expected
liability to all Ps who bring individual cases in the event that certification is denied. D
expects that few such cases will be brought given that each P can expect to recover only
$1,000 in an individual lawsuit. The conditions are present for a settlement class which
provides only such relief as may be needed to justify a fee for P’s attorney.110 The result
would be a settlement below $500 per P. This is a blackmail settlement in reverse: class
claims are sold out for pennies on the dollars. The super-weak rule does not eliminate the
unfairness but only shifts its incidence.
Other problems become apparent when we allow for party error about p. It will
be rare for P and D to know p with certainty. It will often be the case, instead, that they
are mutually optimistic – P thinks p is higher than D thinks it is. In fact, given the
conditions of the model, disagreement about p would be implied if P moves for class
certification.111
Suppose D incorrectly believes p is 1% and P correctly believes p is 5%. Under a
strong-form rule, the court will certify the class and D will pay $10,000,000 to settle the
class claims. This settlement is fair: each class member receives $10,000 which is only
twice p x d ($5,000).
110

Providing the parties can get this settlement past a reviewing court.
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The result is different under a super-weak rule. Suppose that after conducting the
preliminary inquiry the court is equally likely to agree with D or P. If the court agrees with
P, the case will be certified and the court will issue a ruling accurately assessing p at 5%.
After reviewing the ruling, D would adjust its assessment of p to 5%. D now estimates its
expected judgment at trial as $5,000 per P or $5,000,000 overall. Facing possible financial
distress from a class-wide judgment, D will settle for ten times the expected judgment at
trial, or $50,000,000. The settlement is unfair.
The court might agree with D that p is only 1%. If the court agrees with D, the case
will not be certified and D will pay Ps who sue individually $1,000 to settle their individual
cases. This is a good outcome for D although unfair for P. Even so, D’s expected
settlement cost under the super-weak rule is more than $25,000,000 (50% x $50,000,000 +
50% x the expected costs of individual cases that would be litigated if the case is not
certified). D’s expected settlement cost of > $25,000 per class member is unfair because it
is more than five times greater than p x d.
The possibility of judicial error in assessing p exacerbates problems of fairness in
settlement under a super-weak rule. Suppose in the example above that P evaluates p at 5%
and D evaluates p at 1%. The result under a strong-form regime is the same as before:
because the court takes no account of the merits, the case will be certified and D will pay
$10,000,000 in settlement.
Under a super-weak regime, the outcome depends on the nature of the error.
Suppose that the true value of p is 1% but the court erroneously assesses p at 5%. Because
the court (erroneously) concludes that the class claims have merit, it certifies the class.
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If both parties know that p is 1% and know that the other knows this, and they also know that the
court will correctly analyze p in the preliminary inquiry, then P would never bother to seek certification.
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Assume further that the court is conditioned into an overly favorable view of the class’s
case as a result of the mistaken preliminary inquiry, and that in consequence p becomes
5%. D reviews the decision on class certification which discloses the court’s preliminary
assessment of p. D estimates that because the court is now conditioned into a favorable
view of the class’s case, the value of p is 5%. Because D is averse to the risk of the
maximum possible judgment of $100,000,000, D pays ten times the expected judgment at
trial or $50,000,000 in settlement. The unfairness of the settlement for D is magnified as a
result of the super-weak rule: D pays each class member fifty times p x d.
Suppose that the true value of p is 5% but the court erroneously assesses p at 1%.
The court will refuse to certify the class. Ps have to sue individually or recover nothing.
Because their individual claims are small, few of them are likely to sue. Moreover, the
likelihood they will sue is further reduced by the court’s mistake at certification. Since the
court issues an opinion disclosing its (erroneous) estimate of p – an opinion that will be
available to any court adjudicating the individual suits – Ps will need to adjust downward
their estimates of p. Instead of receiving $50,000,000 – the amount D would pay to settle
the class case if the court correctly estimated p – or even $10,000,000 – the fair settlement
if the court correctly estimated p – Ps receive only a few thousand dollars in the aggregate,
a outcome even more unfair than the situation where the court correctly estimates p at 1%.
Judicial error under a super-weak rule can thus result in settlements that are unfair
to either P or D. As between them, however, P is more likely to suffer harm. The reason is
that because the preliminary inquiry into p occurs early in the litigation, D will be able
control the information available to the court. D’s advantage would be even greater if the
court adopted the recommendation of some commentators that p should be determined
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through test-case litigation.112 In such litigation the stakes for D would be far greater than
the stakes for any P. For this reason, D will tend to expend greater resources than Ps and
will have an incentive to offer generous settlements to make test cases “go away” if they
have bad facts. The predictable result is that test case litigation will generate estimates of p
that are below the true value of that parameter.
Weak-form rules appear to offer a better mix of settlement effects than either of the
alternatives. Unlike strong-form rules, they do not require the trial court to accept the
plaintiff’s allegations as true. In consequence, they will sometimes work to prevent
certification of cases when the defendant’s aversion to the risk of a ruinous judgment forces
an unfair settlement. On the other hand, weak-form rules are less likely than super-weak
rules to have other adverse settlement effects. They do not preclude certification of lowprobability, non-frivolous cases. Thus they are less likely to force class counsel to settle
out claims for much less than their expected value at trial in order to avoid the lack of any
recovery at all that would follow from denial of certification. Moreover, weak-form rules,
unlike super-weak rules, do not interact pathologically with party or judicial error.113
VI. Judicial Economy
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See Geoffrey Hazard, Class Certification Based on the Merits of the Claims, 69 Tennessee Law
Review 1 (2001) (proposing that a sample of “typical” claims be tried prior to final certification in order to
provide information about the value of the class claims). The Seventh Circuit, in Rhone-Poulenc, did
something like this when it examined the results of individual cases already completed in order to assess the
value of p. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (based on the fact that
defendants had won 12 of 13 individual cases the court concluded that there was a “great likelihood” that the
class claims “lacked legal merit”). Judge Parker of the Eastern District of Texas proposed a similar procedure
for assessing the value of asbestos cases, although for purposes of deciding the case on the merits rather than
class certification. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990). However, the
idea was rejected by the Fifth Circuit. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
113
If, for example, D erroneously estimates p as low, the results of the preliminary inquiry under a
weak-form rule will not necessarily cause D to revise its estimate of p upward by a significant amount because
the court’s opinion will not reveal much information about p. The problem of unfair settlements will not be
magnified as under a super-weak regime. Similarly, judicial error will be less of a problem under a weakform rule. Courts will be less prone to make errors about the specific issues relevant to certification. And if
error occurs, it will be less likely to cause error at trial and thus will have a smaller effect on D’s estimate of p.
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A final consideration in the design of an Eisen rule is its effect on judicial
economy.114 A strong-form rule conserves judicial and party resources because it
obviates any need for the court to inquire into the merits at certification. The fact that a
strong-form rule achieves this kind of economy is hardly an argument in its favor. The
same sort of economy could be achieved any time issues are excluded from a case. If a
court in an antitrust case simply declared, without evidence, that the defendant possessed
power in the relevant market, this would certainly simplify the trial of the case, but it
would do so at a high and inappropriate cost since the existence of market power is one
of the principal matters at issue in the litigation. When an inquiry into the merits is
necessary or appropriate to resolve an important issue for certification, the summary
adjudication made possible by a strong-form rule requires greater justification than the
fact that it will save resources for the court and the parties.115
The efficiency effects of super-weak rules are ambiguous. Because p is the
ultimate issue in the litigation, the preliminary inquiry must be extensive enough to yield
an informed decision. If the result of that inquiry is an accurate conclusion that the case
lacks merit, the court will refuse to certify the class. The denial of certification conserves
on judicial resources in the class case, since the expected outcome is that the class would
lose at any event at trial. But the denial of certification also permits Ps to sue
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See Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law
Journal 1251, 1316-18 (2002) (analyzing “process costs” of rules on certification and the substantive merits).
115
In other cases, moreover, a strong-form rule can foster diseconomy rather than economies of
litigation. Consider a case where the judge, from prior experience with the subject matter of a case, knows
that she is likely to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The arguments that would be fatal
to the claim on the motion to dismiss are also brought forward by the defendant as objections to certifying
the class. It would make little sense, in this scenario, for the court to apply a strong-form rule to avoid
reaching the merits, certify the class and only then reach the and either dismiss the case or decertify the
class. Cf. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 n.11 (4th Cir. 1980) (observing the
potential waste of judicial resources inherent in deferred denial of class certification based on adverse merits
determinations, but viewing such a waste as real only if the court could have decided the merits earlier).

41

individually. If, as often will be the case, such suits are not pursued, the super-weak rule
will conserve resources. But if Ps sue individually, notwithstanding the court’s
preliminary assessment that the case lacks merit, the burden on the court could increase
because issues that could be handled on a common basis in class litigation must now be
litigated separately in each individual case.
If after initial inquiry the court concludes that the case has merit, the super-weak
rule could increase the burden on the court and the parties to the extent that overlapping
issues will have to be retried at the merits phase. Intelligent litigation management can
reduce the overlap.116 But inevitably some inefficiency will result: there will be
duplication in discovery, multiple depositions, and extra judicial hearings. On the other
hand, the preliminary inquiry may conserve on resources if it extent that results in more
informed judicial decisions during the trial phase. Even more important, the court’s
preliminary assessment of p may induce the parties to adopt more realistic bargaining
positions and thus facilitate earlier settlements.
The efficiency implications of the weak- form rule are also ambiguous. Because
they do authorize preliminary inquiries into the merits, weak-form rules are more
burdensome at the front end than strong-form rules. But because the inquiry is focused
on merits issues that specifically relate to the certification requirements of Rule 23, weakform rules entail a less onerous inquiry than would be implied by super-weak rules. As
in the case of super-weak rules, moreover, preliminary inquiries under a weak-form rule
might have efficiency-enhancing effects to the extent that they focus the trial court’s
attention on the case at an early point in the litigation and induce better trial and pretrial
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management. Preliminary merits rulings under weak-form rules may also facilitate
earlier settlements, although the settlement effect for weak-form rules is likely to be less
pronounced than for super-weak rules where the court’s preliminary assessment of p
addresses the ultimate question in the lawsuit. Similarly, the potential inefficiencies of
the preliminary inquiry under a weak-form rule can be mitigated if the parties and the
trial court organize the inquiry in such a way that the efforts of the court and the parties
are not duplicated at trial.
VII. Why a Weak-Form Rule is Best
We can now draw the strands of normative analysis together in order to develop
an overall assessment of which rule offers the best combination of social policy benefits.
Strong-form rules have little to recommend them and should be abandoned.117
They cannot be justified as plausible interpretations of Rule 23 and are in fact
inconsistent with Rule 23 insofar as they bar courts from inquiring into relevant matters.
Strong-form rules impair the accuracy of certification decisions by excluding
relevant information. They may increase the accuracy of trial outcomes by preventing
the court from making mistakes at certification that “color” subsequent proceedings. But
this effect is ambiguous because early exposure to merits issues may improve rather than
impair trial outcomes. Even if trial outcomes are improved, on balance, the increase in
accuracy at trial provided by a strong-form rule would have to be weighed against the
loss of accuracy at certification. Given the widely-recognized importance of certification
116

See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 400 (1996) (arguing that much of the work of the preliminary
investigation into the substantive merits could be reused at trial).
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This view is shared by other recent commentators. See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for
Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1996)
(advocating jettisoning strong-form rule in its entirety); Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification
and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251 (2002) (same).
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for the success or failure of class litigation, it is unlikely that the increase in trial accuracy
which a strong-form rule might accomplish could justify the significant decrease in
accuracy at certification.
Strong-form rules find limited support in the concern for fairness to defendants,
since if rigorously applied they prevent class members from taking advantage of
favorable outcomes while avoiding the binding effects of unfavorable ones. But a
number of events or conditions have to coincide before cherry-picking or cherrydropping will result in harm to defendants. Moreover, while defendants benefit from the
leveling of the playing field with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments, they suffer
collateral harm from the increased settlement pressure that follows when the court
accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. Nor can strong-form rules
be justified as means for conserving litigation resources. To the extent they reduce the
burden on the parties and the courts, they do so only by removing relevant considerations
from the court’s analysis. This is not a good justification for judicial economy.
Super-weak rules are equally undesirable and should not be adopted. They have
no basis in the text or history of Rule 23. Because they permit or require trial courts to
inquire into an issue that is not an explicit certification factor under Rule 23, they may
introduce a confounding issue that results in erroneous certification decisions. They
present a substantial risk of “coloring” the trial with potentially erroneous findings.
Fairness to the defendant with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments is also a
concern under super-weak rules. These rules provide significant information that may
give plaintiffs an unfair advantage in making opt-out decisions. They also align the
certification decision with the ultimate result at trial, resulting in an automatic “cherry-
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dropping” benefit to class members. Although defendants will only occasionally
experience significant harm from these scenarios, the risk of unfairness to defendants that
troubled the Court in Eisen is not insubstantial.
Super-weak rules address the problem of unfair settlements of weak cases. But
they do so only by introducing other problems. Denial of certification of non-frivolous
but weak cases has devastating settlement consequences for class members. Moreover,
problems of unfair settlements are exacerbated under a super-weak regime when party or
judicial error is introduced. Super-weak rules likewise appear less attractive from the
standpoint of judicial efficiency. Because they require the court to conduct an inquiry into
the ultimate issue at trial, the certification stage can be anticipated to be costly for the
parties and time-consuming for the court. This fact in itself would not be troubling if the
results of the preliminary inquiry could be utilized at later stages of the case or in individual
litigation of cases after certification is denied. But often the efforts will be wasted.
Weak-form rules are superior along most of the relevant policy dimensions. Such
rules easy to justify in the language of Rule 23 and finds increasing support in the lower
federal courts and the views of some commentators.118 Weak-form rules provide greater
accuracy in the certification decision than either a strong-form rule or a super-weak rule.
As to accuracy at trial, weak-form rules are likely to be superior to super-weak rules
(because of the risk that error in assessing p will color subsequent proceedings and result in
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Bone and Evans endorse a weak-form rule as one possible approach, although for different reasons
than those set forth in this Article. See Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251, 1278 (2002) (offering the principle that the “trial judge
[should] review the evidence and determine whether the legal and factual issues on which the parties rely to
support (or oppose) commonality, typicality, predominance and other Rule 23 certification requirements are in
fact viable”). Their arguments in favor of weak-form rules are, however, different from the arguments
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erroneous outcomes). Weak-form rules have strengths and weaknesses, with respect to
error at trial, as compared with strong-form rules.
Weak-form rules are subject, to some extent, to the problems of cherry-picking and
cherry-dropping discussed earlier in this paper. But because the preliminary inquiry is
restricted to narrow issues, these problems are less severe for weak-form rules than for
super-weak rules. As applied to weak-form rules, at least, the poltergeist of one-way
intervention conjured in Eisen has few material manifestations.
Weak-form rules provide some protections to defendants against the risk of unfair
settlements. Because there is a strong expected alignment between the preliminary findings
on the merits and a court’s propensity to certify the class, negative findings on merits issues
will often prevent certification. Thus, if the class cases are extremely weak, the result even
under a weak-form rule may be denial of certification. In this respect, weak-form rules are
arguably superior to strong-form rules that offer no protection against certification of
doubtful cases. Super-weak rules appear to offer still greater protections in this regard, but
they do so at unacceptable costs in other respects.
Weak-form rules are more demanding of judicial and party resources than strongform rules that preclude all preliminary inquiry into the merits. But as noted above, some
of the work at the initial inquiry stage could be recycled. Weak-form rules appear to
achieve greater litigation efficiency than super-weak rules which require the trial court to
investigate the ultimate issue of the plaintiff’s probability of success.
Conclusion
The strong-form interpretation of Eisen – under which trial court may not conduct
a reasoned inquiry into merits issues as they relate to class certification – cannot be
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justified under any plausible analysis of public policy. It should be abandoned – and soon.
But super-weak rules which permit or even require the court to inquire into the plaintiff’s
ultimate probability of success at trial are also ill-advised. They are not defensible as
interpretations of Rule 23 and are objectionable from the standpoint of the relevant social
policies. The weak-form interpretation, which permits the trial court to investigate the
merits provided that doing so is convenient and useful to analyzing the certification
requirements of Rule 23, provides the best mix of social policy benefits and is most
consistent with the language and spirit of Rule 23.
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